A geometric approach to the theory of evidence by Cuzzolin, Fabio
HAL Id: inria-00590222
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00590222
Submitted on 3 May 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
A geometric approach to the theory of evidence
Fabio Cuzzolin
To cite this version:
Fabio Cuzzolin. A geometric approach to the theory of evidence. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
2008, 38 (4), pp.522-534. ￿10.1109/TSMCC.2008.919174￿. ￿inria-00590222￿
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 2006 1
A geometric approach to the theory of evidence
Fabio Cuzzolin
Abstract
In this paper we propose a geometric approach to the theory of evidence based on convex geometric
interpretations of its two key notions of belief function and Dempster’s sum. On one side, we analyze
the geometry of belief functions as points of a polytope in the Cartesian space called belief space,
and discuss the intimate relationship between basic probability assignment and convex combination.
On the other side, we study the global geometry of Dempster’s rule by describing its action on those
convex combinations. By proving that Dempster’s sum and convex closure commute we become able
to depict the geometric structure of conditional subspaces, i.e. sets of belief functions conditioned by a
given functionb. Natural applications of these geometric methods to classical problems like probabilistic
approximation and canonical decomposition are outlined.
Index Terms
Theory of evidence, belief function, belief space, simplex, Dempster’s rule, commutativity, condi-
tional subspace.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The theory of evidence(ToE) [42] was introduced in the late Seventies by Glenn Shafer as a
way of representing epistemic knowledge, starting from a sequence of seminal works ([18], [19],
[20]) of Arthur Dempster. In this formalism the best representation of chance is abelief function
(b.f.) rather than a Bayesian mass distribution. Belief functions assign probability values tos ts
of possibilities rather than single events: their appeal rests on the fact they naturally encode
evidence in favor topropositions. The theory embraces the familiar idea of assigning numbers
between 0 and 1 to indicate degrees of belief but, instead of focusing onhow these numbers are
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determined, it concerns their combination. A simple method for combining the evidence carried
by a number of different sources calledDempster’s rule[18] is provided which makes no use of
any a-priori distribution. In this sense, following Shafer, it can be seen as a theory of probable
reasoning.
The literature on the ToE is now vast, and includes applications to fields like computer vision
[38], social sciences [31], risk analysis [17], sensor fusion [33]. Recent studies include the design
of classifiers based on belief functions [36], the analysis ofk-additive b.f. [34], and the extension
of the evidential formalism to continuous spaces [37].
When one tries and apply the theory of evidence to classical vision problems, however, a number
of important question arises, stimulating major advances in the theory itself.
In the object trackingcontext, for instance, at each time instant an estimate of the current
configuration or “pose”q(t) of an articulated object, given a sequence of images of the moving
body, is desired. Using an evidential approach [13] image measurements can be represented as
belief functions and combined by means of Dempster’s rule to produce an estimate of the pose
q̂(t) ∈ Q̃, whereQ̃ is a “good” finite approximation of the configuration spaceQ of the object.
This “belief estimate” of the pose expressed as the belief function onQ̃ which emerges from
the feature integration mechanism needs to be processed to extract a point-wise estimateq̂( ) of
the pose. One way to do that is to compute the “best” probabilistic approximationp : Q̃ → [0, 1]
(in some sense) of the belief estimate and computing the corresponding expected pose.
The problem of how to find such an approximation then arises. Many people have in fact
worked on this problem, and a number of papers [53], [21], [22], [28] have been published on
this issue (see [6], [5] for a review), mainly in order to find efficient implementations of the
rule of combination aiming to reduce the number of focal elements. Tessem [48], for instance,
incorporated only the highest-valued focal elements in hismklx approximation; a similar approach
inspired thesummarizationtechnique formulated by Lowrancet al. [32]. The connection
between belief functions and probabilities is as well the basement of a popular approach to
the theory of evidence, Smets’pignistic model [44], in which beliefs are represented at credal
level (as convex sets of probabilities), while decisions are made by resorting to a Bayesian
belief function calledpignistic transformation. On his side, in his 1989 paper [49] F. Voorbraak
proposed to adopt the so-calledrelative plausibility function p̃lb, the unique probability that,
given a belief functionb with plausibilityplb, assigns to each singleton its normalized plausibility.
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Cobb and Shenoy [11], [9], [10] described the properties of this relative plausibility of singletons
and discussed its nature of probability function equivalent to the original belief function when
combined with another probability.
The approximation problem, however, can be cast in a different light, by asking in which
space belief functions live, and what sort of distance is the most suitable to measure distances
between b.f. or between b.f. and probabilities.
It is quite well-known that the set of probability distributions over a finite sample spaceΘ of
sizen can be represented as a polytope (calledprobability simplex) in the Euclidean spaceRn,
whose vertices correspond to probabilities focused on a single element
[1, 0, ..., 0]′, [0, 1, ..., 0]′, · · · , [0, ..., 0, 1]′.
Analogously, as a belief functionb : 2Θ → [0, 1] on Θ is completely specified by itsN − 1,
N = 2|Θ| belief values
{b(A),∀A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅}, (1)
b can be thought of as a vectorv = [vA = b(A), A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅]′ of RN−1. The collectionB
of all the points ofRN which correspond to a belief function turns out to be a polytope too,
which we callbelief space. The approximation problem and a comparative study of admissible
distance functions can then naturally be posed in the framework of the belief space.
Going back to vision, another interesting task calleddata association[3] consists on recon-
structing the association between clouds of moving targets appearing in consecutive images. If
those points belong to an articulated body whose topological model is known (i.e. we know
which pairs of targets are constrained to move rigidly), the rigid motion constraint can be used
in order to achieve the desired correspondence. Different motion constraints can be represented
as belief functions, and combined on the space of all the possible associations between targets
of two consecutive images. However, many of those constraints can be expressed in conditional
way only, the idea of combination ofconditional belief functionsin a filtering-like process has
to be addressed.
In this work we introduce a geometric interpretation of the theory of evidence, in which both
the probabilistic approximation problem and the description of conditional belief functions can
be formalized and solved. We will study the geometry of belief functions and Dempster’s rule
of combination, which provide the basic tools of a geometric approach to the ToE.
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The study of the interplay between belief functions and probabilities has in fact been posed
in a geometric setup by other authors [26], [8], [7], [16]. P. Black, in particular, dedicated his
doctoral thesis to the study of the geometry of belief functions and other monotone capacities
[7]. An abstract of his results can be found in [8], where he uses shapes of geometric loci to
give a direct visualization of the distinct classes of monotone capacities. In particular a number
of results about lengths of edges of convex sets representing monotone capacities are given,
together with theirsizemeant as the sum of those lengths.
Another close reference is perhaps a work [26] of Ha and Haddawy where they propose a
framework in which an “affine operator” is used as a tool for constructing convex sets of
probability distributions, and can be considered a generalization of both belief functions and
interval probabilities. Uncertainty is modeled as a set of probabilities represented as “affine trees”,
while actions (modifications of the uncertain state) are defined as tree manipulators. A small
number of properties of the affine operator are also presented. In a later work [27] they present
the interval generalization of the probability cross-product operator called convex-closure (cc)
operator. They provide an analysis of the properties of the cc-operator relative to manipulations
of sets of probabilities, and formulate interval versions of Bayesian propagation algorithms based
on it. Probability intervals are represented in a computationally efficient fashion, by means of
a data structure calledpcc-tree, in which branches are annotated with intervals, and nodes with
convex sets of probabilities.
In this paper, after recalling the basic notions of the theory of evidence (Section II), we will
briefly present the applications which originally motivated this work, and lay out a research plan
in which geometric interpretations of the two pillars of the ToE (belief functions and rule of
combination) are investigated (Section III). Accordingly in Section IV, starting from the insight
provided by the simple case of a binary frame we will discuss the convexity of the belief space
and some of its regions associated with important classes of b.f., namely Bayesian and simple
support belief functions. Following this line of research in Section V we will prove thatB has
the form of apolytopeor simplex, in which the basic probability assignment of a b.f.b plays
the role of the simplicial coordinate ofb in B.
In Section VI we will instead focus our attention on the second fundamental notion of the ToE,
Dempster’s rule of combination. We will prove a fundamental result on Dempster’s sums of
convex combinations, and use it as a tool to show that the rule of combination commutes with
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the convex closure operator in the belief space. This will allow us to describe the “global”
geometry of the orthogonal sum in terms of simplices calledconditional subspaces.
Finally (Section VII) we will hint to some of the manifold open topics in the geometric approach,
paying particular attention to the probabilistic approximation problem but without forgetting the
geometry of possibility measures and the point-wise geometry of Dempster’s rule.
II. T HE THEORY OF EVIDENCE
Let us first review the basic notions of the theory of evidence.
A. Belief functions and basic probability assignments
Definition 1: A basic probability assignment(b.p.a.) over a finite set (frame of discernment




m(A) = 1, m(A) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊂ Θ.
Subsets ofΘ associated with non-zero values ofm are calledfocal elements, and their unionC
core.
Definition 2: The belief function(b.f.) b : 2Θ → [0, 1] associated with a basic probability





b can be viewed as the total probability induced by the generalized mass assignmentmb, even
though an alternative definition can be given independently from the notion of basic probability
assignment (see [42]).
In the simplest situation the evidence represented by a b.f. points to a single non-empty subset
A of Θ.
Definition 3: A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is calledsimple support functionfocused on
A whenmb(A) = σ, mb(Θ) = 1− σ, while mb(B) = 0 for every otherB ⊂ Θ.
In the general case, though, a belief function supports more than one proposition. In particular,
in the theory of evidence a finite probability function onΘ is just a peculiar b.f. (Bayesian belief
function) assigning non-zero mass to elements of the frame only:
mb(A) = 0 ∀A : |A| > 1
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(where|A| denotes the cardinality of the subsetA).
Belief functions admit the following order relation
b ≤ b′ ≡ b(A) ≤ b′(A) ∀A ⊂ Θ (2)
calledweak inclusion. A probability distributionp such that a belief functionb is weakly included
in p (p(A) ≥ b(A) ∀A) is said to beconsistentwith b [30]: b can be viewed as the lower envelope
of the set of probabilities consistent with it.
B. Dempster’s rule
Belief functions representing distinct bodies of evidence can be combined by means of
Dempster’s rule of combination.
Definition 4: The orthogonal sumor Dempster’s sumof two belief functionsb1, b2 is a new
belief functionb1⊕ b2 whose focal elements are all the possible non-empty intersectionsAi∩Bj









wheremb1 andmb2 denote the b.p.a.s ofb1 and b2 respectively.
We denote withk(b1, b2) the denominator of Equation (3). The quantityCon(b1, b2)
.
= 1 −
k(b1, b2) measures thedegree of conflict[42] of the two belief functions, i.e. the amount
of probability they attribute to contradictory (i.e. disjoint) subsets. WhenCon(b1, b2) = 1
(k(b1, b2) = 0) the two functions cannot be combined.
Dempster’s rule can be naturally extended to the combination of several belief functions.
III. A GEOMETRIC APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE
When one tries and apply the theory of evidence to classical vision problems some important
questions arise, stimulating major advances in the theory itself. Object tracking [35], for instance
is one of the most active fields of computer vision, and concerns the reconstruction of the actual
configuration or “pose” of a moving object by processing the sequence of images taken during
its motion.
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A. Object tracking and the probabilistic approximation problem
Let us assume that the pose of the moving object can be expressed as a pointq of some region
Q of RD, calledconfiguration space. In case of rigid bodies the pose is simply the position and
orientation of the object with respect to some fixed reference frame. If the body isarticulated
(composed by several rigid bodies) like a human arm or hand, its pose also describes its internal
configuration. Most of the literature concernsmodel-basedapproaches [25], in which some a-
priori model of the body is used to help the estimation. In case of articulated objects composed
by a number of rigid parts, a popular choice is to use a kinematic model.
However, when we have no a-priori information about the nature itself of the body (i.e. rigid,
articulated, deformable, etc.), the only way of doing inference on the object pose is building a
map between some salient image measurements (features) and poses in a learning stage.
In a training session the object describes a trajectory which approximates the actual parameter
spaceQ: a finite approximationQ̃ = {qk, k = 1, ..., T} of the parameter space is hence acquired
as the collection of poses assumed by the object in the training session. These ground truth
configuration valuesqk can be produced for instance by a motion capture system, i.e. a machinery
able to provide the 3D positions of reflective markers given the images coming from a set of
calibrated cameras. At the same time, a number of featuresyi are extracted from the available
image sequences. For instance, in [15] we adopted color segmentation to separate the moving
body (Figure 1-left) from a non-static background through a colorimetric analysis of the body of
interest (Figure 1-right). We then found the bounding box (in red) around the the silhouette of the
segmented upper torso or legs, and chose as features the coordinates of the vertices of the box. To










Fig. 1. Left. Training image of a person moving his right arm. Right. Feature extraction process: the object of interest is color
segmented, and the bounding box (in red) around it is detected.
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learn maps between features and poses, feature ranges are discretized by feeding ahidden Markov
model(HMM) with the acquired measurements, yielding a partition{Yj, j = 1, ..., N} (where
N is the number of states of the HMM) of their ranges (see Figure 2-left). As a consequence,







Range Y of the feature function y (feature space)







































Fig. 2. Left. Implicit partition associated with a Markov model with three states. To each state corresponds a Gaussian density
on the rangeY of the feature function (abscissa). They define a partition of the range into three regionsY1,Y2,Y3 (separated
by the vertical lines). Right. Evidential model architecture.
each elementYj of this partition is mapped to the set of training poses whose feature value fall
in Yj:
ρ : Yj 7→ {qk : y(qk) ∈ Yj}.
In the evidential language, the mapsρi for all featuresi are refinings.
Definition 5: Given two framesΘ and Ω, a mapρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is a refining if it satisfies
the following conditions: 1.ρ({θ}) 6= ∅ ∀θ ∈ Θ; 2. ρ({θ}) ∩ ρ({θ′}) = ∅ if θ 6= θ′; 3.
∪θ∈Θρ({θ}) = Ω.
The finer frame is called arefinementof the first one andΘ a coarseningof Ω.
The refiningsρi, together with discrete feature and parameter spaces, form the learnedevid ntial
modelof the object (Figure 2-right). When the object evolves freely, the evidential model can
be used to estimate its pose by encoding new features as belief functions, projecting them onto
Q̃, and combining them through Dempster’s rule. This yields a belief estimateb̂ : 2Q̃ → [0, 1] of
the pose, which then needs to processed to extract a pointwise estimateq̂(t) of the configuration.
A natural way is to approximatêb with a finite probabilityp̂ on Q̃, and then compute its mean
August 29, 2006 DRAFT






B. A geometric approach
An evidential solution to the object tracking problem then involves facing the probabilistic
approximation problem. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the problem has been studied by
many people. However, this can be posed in a different setting by investigating the shape of the
space belief functions live, asking ourselves where do probability functions live in this space,
and which is the correct distance to use to evaluate the difference between a belief function
and a probability. The aim of this paper is to use the language of convex geometry to define a
framework in which to answer all those questions.
The first pillar of the theory of evidence is the notion of basic probability assignment, i.e. the
idea of assigning masses directly to events instead of elements of a frame. In the following two
sections we are going to see that b.p.a.s translate naturally into the convex geometric language.
We will first define the notion ofbelief spaceB as the space of all the belief functions on a
given frame, and analyze the simplest case of a binary domain to get some intuitions about its
properties for general frames. In particular we will observe that all probabilities live in a region
which dominates the belief space (in the sense of Section II-A). The latter turns out to be convex,
in analogy to a similar result for lower previsions [50].
In Section V instead, after noticing thatB is a triangle in the binary case we will prove and
discuss the general form of the belief space as apolytopeor simplex.
Belief functions are useful when combined in an evidence revision process. The mechanism
which regulates this process in the theory of evidence is Dempster’s rule. In the second part of
the paper we will then study the behavior of the rule of combination in our geometric framework,
and give a description of the notion of conditional b.f. in geometric terms.
IV. T HE SPACE OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS
Consider a frame of discernmentΘ and introduce in the Cartesian spaceRN−1, whereN = 2|Θ|
is the number of non-empty subsets ofΘ, a reference frame (a set of linearly independent vectors)
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vAXA = [vA, A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅]′.
For instance, ifΘ = {x, y, z} each vector has the formv = [vx, vy, vz, v{x,y}, v{x,z}, v{y,z}, vΘ]′.
As each belief functionb on Θ is completely specified by its belief valuesb(A) on all the
N − 1 subsets ofΘ (∅ can be neglected asb(∅) = 0) thenv is potentiallya belief function, its
componentvA measuring the belief value ofA:
vA = b(A) ∀A ⊂ Θ. (4)
However, not every vectorv ∈ RN−1 represents a valid belief function, as it may not meet the
conditions of Definition 1.
Definition 6: Thebelief spaceassociated with a frameΘ is the set of pointsB of RN−1 which
correspond to a valid belief function (Equation (4)).
Let us study some of the properties ofB to get first a rough idea of the shape of the belief
space.
A. Belief space for a binary frame
To get some insight about the properties and geometric shape of the belief space it may be
useful to have first a look at how belief functions defined on a frame of discernment with just
two elementsΘ2 = {x, y} can be represented as points of a Cartesian space.
In this very simple case each belief functionb : 2Θ2 → [0, 1] is completely determined by
its belief valuesb(x), b(y) and b(Θ) (sinceb(∅) = 0 for all b). We can then collect them in a
three-dimensional vector
[b(x), b(y), b(Θ)]′ ∈ R3
and associateb with a point ofR3.
However, since it is always true thatb(Θ) =
∑
A⊂Θ mb(A) = 1, the last coordinate of the vector
can also be neglected (this is of course true for arbitrary frames too). In the binary case this
means that we can representb as the vector
[b(x) = mb(x), b(y) = mb(y)]
′ ∈ R2 (5)
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of RN−2 = R2 (sinceN = 22 = 4).
Sincemb(x) ≥ 0, mb(y) ≥ 0, andmb(x) + mb(y) ≤ 1 we can easily infer that the setB2 of
all the possible belief functions onΘ2 can be depicted as the triangle in the Cartesian plane of
Figure 3, whose vertices are the points
bΘ = [0, 0]
′, bx = [1, 0]′, by = [0, 1]′
which correspond (through Equation (5)) respectively to the vacuous belief functionbΘ (mbΘ(Θ) =



















Fig. 3. The belief spaceB for a binary frame is a triangle inR2 whose vertices are the basis belief functions focused on
{x}, {y} andΘ, bx, by, bΘ respectively. The probability region is the segmentCl(bx, by), while the set of probabilities consistent
with a b.f. b is also a segment, whose extreme points are given by Equation (7).
Xx = [1, 0]
′, Xy = [0, 1]′ form a reference frame{XA : A ⊂ Θ, A 6= Θ, ∅} in the Cartesian
plane.
The Bayesian belief functions onΘ2 obey the constraint
mb(x) + mb(y) = 1




b(A) = b(x) + b(y) + b(Θ2) = mb(x) + mb(y) + 1 = 2−mb(Θ) (6)
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which is equal to 2 iffb is Bayesian.
The set of Bayesian b.f. consistent withb is the segmentP [b] in Figure 3 whose extreme
points are the probabilities
[mb(x), 1−mb(x)]′, [1−mb(y),mb(y)]′. (7)
The L1 distance betweenb andP [b]
‖b, P [b]‖1 = max
p∈P [b]
{|b(x)− p(x)|, |b(y)− p(y)|} = mb(Θ2)
is the massmb(Θ) assigned to the whole frame.
From this example we can observe that
• the belief spaceB and the Bayesian spaceP areconvex: given any two points inB,P, the
segment joining them is entirely inB,P;
• moreover,B,P are bothpolytopesor simplices, i.e. convex closures of a finite sets of points
B2 = Cl(bΘ, bx, by) P2 = Cl(bx, by)










αi = 1, αi ≥ 0
}
. (8)
• the set of probabilities consistent with a belief functionb is also a simplex (a segment in
the binary case).
We are going to see that these are general properties, valid for arbitrary frames.
B. The region of dominating probabilities
Let us start with a first characterization of the geometry of Bayesian belief functions. Let us
denote withn
.
= |Θ| the cardinality ofΘ. From the binary example we learned that that the
probabilities on a frameΘ live in a well determined polytope inR2.
Generalizing condition (6) we can define
P =
{
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Theorem 1:The region of the belief space associated with all the Bayesian belief functions
on Θ is the set (9).











mb(B)|{A : B ⊂ A ⊂ Θ}|
as each subsetB is counted as many times as there areA′s containing it. But since
|{A : B ⊂ A ⊂ Θ}| = |{C ⊂ (Θ \B)}| = 2|Θ\B| = 2n−|B|








If b is Bayesianmb(A) = 0 ∀A : |A| > 1, and
∑



















x∈Θ mb(x) = 1, i.e. b is Bayesian.
As the example of Section IV-A suggests, the belief spaceB is always dominated by the
probability regionP.
Theorem 2:The belief spaceB is dominated by the probability regionP, namely:
∑
A⊂Θ
b(A) ≤ 2n−1 ∀b ∈ B
where the equality holds iffb is Bayesian.
Proof: Recalling Equation (10), and after noticing that2|Θ\B| ≤ 2n−1 (where the equality












where the equality holds iff|A| = 1 for every focal element ofb, i.e. b is Bayesian.
C. Convexity
The binary example also suggests that the belief space could be convex in the general case
too. A similar result for a wider class of fuzzy measures, called coherent lower previsions, is in
fact well known.
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1) Convexity results for coherent lower previsions:It is well-known that belief functions are
a special type ofcoherent lower probabilities, which in turn can be seen as a particular class of
lower previsions(consult [50], section 5.13). More precisely,




is called lower envelopeof K, or coherent lower probability.
A belief function is by definition the lower envelope of the set of probabilities consistent with
it (2).
Definition 8: SupposeA is a collection of subsets ofΘ andP a lower probability defined on
A such thatP (∅) = 0, P (Θ) = 1 and P (A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ A. ThenP is calledcompletely











The above condition clearly resounds thesuperadditivityaxiom [42] of Shafer’s definition of
belief functions: for every positive integern and every collectionA1, ..., An ∈ 2Θ






b(Ai ∩ Aj) + ... + (−1)n+1b(A1 ∩ ... ∩ An). (11)
Hence
Proposition 1: Belief functions are completely monotone coherent lower probabilities.
A proof of this result can be found in [50]. Walley has also proved that
Proposition 2: Coherent lower probabilities are closed under convex combination.
This implies that convex combinations of belief functions are still coherent. Here we are going
to prove a stronger result.
2) Möbius inversion lemma and proof of convexity:Given a belief functionb the corresponding





1See [1] for an explanation in terms of the theory of monotone functions over partially ordered sets.
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We can hence decide whether a pointv ∈ RN−1 is a belief function by computing its b.p.a. and




mb(A) = 1 trivially translates into
B ⊂ {v ∈ RN−1 : vΘ = 1}. (13)
As we have seen in the binary case, this implies that belief functions can indeed be represented
as points ofRN−2. From now on we will then think ofB as a subset ofRN−2.
The positivity condition instead
mb(A) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊂ Θ,








b(B) + · · ·+ (−1)|A|−1
∑
x∈Θ
b(x) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊂ Θ.
(14)







we can use them to prove that
Theorem 3:The belief spaceB is convex.
Proof: Let us consider two pointsb0, b1 ∈ B and prove that all the pointsbα in the segment




































i.e. bα ∈ B.
Theorem 3 is a strengthening of Proposition 2, stating that convex combinations of belief
functions are not only coherent, but also completely monotone.
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V. SIMPLICIAL FORM OF THE BELIEF SPACE
It is quite well-known that the set of probability distributions over a finite sample spaceΘ
of cardinalityn can be represented as a polytope or simplex (calledprobability simplex) in the
Cartesian spaceRn, n = |Θ|, whose vertices are then versors ofRn itself,
[1, 0, ..., 0]′, [0, 1, ..., 0]′, · · · , [0, ..., 0, 1]′.
On the other side, we have seen in Section IV-C that the belief space is convex. In fact, the
binary example of Section IV-A has shown thatB is a triangle (2-dim simplex) in the case of size
2 frames. We are ready to prove that the belief space can be given a polytope-like description
for arbitrary frames too, generalizing the case of probability distributions [26].
A. Basis belief functions and simplex of belief functions
We have seen that in the binary example the belief space was a triangle, whose vertices were
the following N − 1 = 22 − 1 = 3 vectors ofR2
bx = [1, 0]
′, by = [0, 1]′, bΘ = [0, 0]′.
To prove thatB is in fact a polytope in the general case too we first need to understand the
geometric behavior of the basic probability assignment.
Theorem 4:The set of all the belief functions with focal elements in a given collection
{A1, ..., Am} is closed and convex inB, namely
{b : Eb ⊂ {A1, ..., Am}} = Cl(bAi , i = 1, ..., m)





1 if B ⊃ A
0 if B 6⊃ A.
(16)






mb(B), A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅, Θ
]′
for some collection of subsetsEb ⊂ {A1, ..., Am}.
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1 if A ⊃ B
0 if A 6⊃ B.
selects the subsetsB of A.
After collecting the valuesbB(A) in a vectorbB = [bB(A), A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅, Θ]′ we can express











asmb(B) = 0 wheneverAi 6∈ Eb. Sincemb is a basic probability assignment,
∑m
i=1 mb(Ai) = 1, mb(Ai) ≥ 0 ∀i
so that by definition of convex closure (8)
{









= Cl(bAi , i = 1, ...,m).
Proposition 3: The vectorbA defined by Equation (16) is the simple support b.f. assigning
unitary mass to a single subsetA:
mbA(A) = 1, mbA(B) = 0 ∀B 6= A; (17)
we call it A-th basis belief function.








1 B ⊃ A
0 B 6⊃ A
which is exactly Equation (16).
Immediately, sinceB is the collection of belief functionsb with focal elements in2Θ \ ∅ (Eb ⊂
2Θ \ ∅),
Corollary 1: The belief spaceB is the convex closure of all the basis belief functions,
B = Cl(bA, A ⊂ Θ, A 6= ∅). (18)
Note that even though the vectors{bA} areN − 2-dimensional,B hasN − 1 vertices, including
the basis b.f.bΘ. SincebΘ(B) = 0 ∀B ⊂ Θ, B 6= Θ the vectorbΘ = 0 coincides with the origin
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Fig. 4. Simplicial structure of the belief spaceB = Cl(bA, A 6= ∅): its vertices are all the basis belief functionsbA represented
as vectors ofRN−2. The probabilistic subspace is a subsetP = Cl(bx, x ∈ Θ) of its border.
of RN−2. The convex closure of a set of points is also called asimplex. Corollary 1 then states
that B is the simplex whose vertices are all the basis b.f. The situation is illustrated in Figure





In other words, a basic probability assignment is geometrically a choice ofsimplicial coordinates
for b in the polytopeB.
B. Faces ofB as classes of belief functions
Obviously a Bayesian belief function (a finite probability) is a b.f. with focal elements in the
collection of the singletons:Cb = {{x1}, ..., {xn}}. Immediately by Theorem 4
Corollary 2: The region of the belief space corresponding to probability functions is the part
of its border determined by all the simple probabilities, i.e. the simplex2
P = Cl(bx, x ∈ Θ).
2With a harmless abuse of notation we denote the basis belief function associated with a singletonx by bx instead ofb{x}.
Accordingly we will write mb(x) instead ofmb({x}).
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The polytopes whose vertices are a subset of the collection of vertices of a simplex are called
facesof the simplex.P is then a(n − 1)-dimensional face ofB (whose dimension is instead










Fig. 5. Locations of the major classes of belief functions in the binary belief space.
On the other side, some one-dimensional faces of the belief space have also an intuitive
meaning in terms of belief. Consider the segmentsCl(bΘ, bA) joining the vacuous belief function
bΘ (mbΘ(Θ) = 1,mbΘ(B) = 0 ∀B 6= Θ) with the basis b.f.bA (16). Points ofCl(bΘ, bA) can be
written as a convex combination as
b = αbA + (1− α)bΘ.
Since convex combinations are b.p.a.s inB, such a belief functionb has b.p.a.
mb(A) = α, mb(Θ) = 1− α
i.e. b is a simple support function focused onA (Definition 3).





is the region of simple support belief functions onΘ.
Let us consider again the binary case (Figure 5). Simple support functions focused on{x} lie
on the horizontal segmentCl(bΘ, bx), while simple support b.f. focused on{y} form the vertical
segmentCl(bΘ, by).
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C. Geometry of consistent probabilities
We have seen in Section IV-A that the setP [b] of the probability functions consistent with
a given b.f.b is in the binary case a segment, i.e. a one-dimensional polytope. As a matter of
fact, Haet al. [26] proved thatP [b] can be expressed in the probability simplex as the sum of






where conv(Ai) is the convex closure of the probabilities assigning 1 to a particular element
x of Ai. We can think of the basic probabilitymb(A) of a focal elementA as a probability
free to move insideA. Intuitively then, if we assign the mass of each focal elementAi to
one of its pointsxi ∈ Ai we get an extremum of the region of consistent probabilities. More
formally, to each focal elementA corresponds a massmb(A) distributed among its elements,
mb(A) · Cl(bx, x ∈ A), so thatP [b] can be expressed as in (19) in an arbitrary belief space.
Let us then find an explicit expression for (19). Given an arbitrary belief functionb with focal
elementsA1, ..., Ak, we can define for each choice ofk representatives{x1, ..., xk}, xi ∈ Ai ∀i







Theorem 5:P [b] = Cl(b(x1, ..., xk), {x1, ..., xk} ∈ A1 × ...× Ak).

































































































αji = 1 ∀i
} (21)
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= αj11 · αj22 . Clearly the expression inside the square brackets has the same shape as
above, so that by induction on the number of focal elements we have as desired.


























as each basis probabilitybx appears in (22) with coefficientmb(Aj) a number of times
∏
i6=j |Ai|
equal to the number of possible choices of the representatives for the other focal elements ofb.














(since no focal elements include points outside the core), which is nothing but the pignistic
function.
The geometric analysis of the convex region of the consistent probabilities can be related to a
popular technique in robust statistics, the Epsilon Contamination Model. For a fixed0 < ε < 1
and a probability distributionP ∗, the associatedε-contamination model is a convex class of
distributions of the form{(1− ε)P ∗ + εQ} whereQ is an arbitrary probability distribution.
Teddy Seidenfeld has proved that (for discrete domains) anyε-contamination model is equivalent
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to a belief function, whose corresponding consistent probabilities form the largest convex set
induced by the collection of coherent lower probabilities the model specifies for the elements
of the domain (see [40], Theorem 2.10). It is worth noticing that in this special caseP ∗ has
the meaning of barycenter of the convex set, providing then another interesting interpretation of
Equation (22).
VI. GEOMETRY OFDEMPSTER’ S RULE
In the first part of the paper we investigated the geometric properties of the first pillar of the
theory of evidence, the twin notions of belief function and basic probability assignment. We
now know that belief functions live in a simplex in the Cartesian spaceR2|Θ|−2 whose vertices
represent b.f. focused on a single event, and where b.p.a.s can be interpreted as simplicial
coordinates of the points representing them.
It is now time to study the geometry of the other key concept of the theory of evidence,
Dempster’s rule of combination, which is in turn related to the notion ofconditional belief
function.
In the literature, in fact, conditional belief functions have been given several alternative
definitions by different authors [41]. Fagin and Halpern, for instance, defined a notion of
conditional belief [24] as the lower envelope of a family of conditional probability functions,
and provided a closed-form expression for it. On the other side, M. Spies [47] established a
link between conditional events and discrete random sets. Conditional events were defined as
sets of equivalent events under the conditioning relation. By applying to them a multi-valued
mapping (which induces a belief function according to Dempster’s original formulation) he gave
a new definition of conditional belief function. An updating rule equivalent to the law of total
probability when all beliefs are probabilities was introduced.
In [43] Slobodova described instead how conditional belief functions (defined as in Spies’
approach) fit in the framework of valuation-based systems, while Xu and Smets ([51], [52])
showed how to use conditional belief functions to represent relations among variables as joint
belief functions on the product space of the involved variables, and presented a propagation
algorithm for such a network. Graphical belief models have been formulated and described [2],
and the nature of belief propagations in evidential networks has been investigated [54].
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In the following we will call conditional belief functionb|b′ the combination ofb with b′
b|b′ = b⊕ b′.
In this form conditional belief functions arise from the application of the theory of evidence
to estimation problems in which some sort of “temporal coherence” has to be enforced.Data
associationis a typical example.
A. Data association and conditional belief functions
In thedata associationproblem a number of points moving in the 3D space are tracked by one
or more cameras and appear in an image sequence as unlabeled (undistinguishable) points, and
we seek for the correspondences between points of two consecutive frames. A popular approach
called joint probabilistic data associationfilter [3] is based on the implementation of a number
of Kalman filters (each associated to a feature point) to predict the future position of the target.
Unfortunately, when several features converge to a small region the algorithm cannot distinguish
between them.
However, when additional information is available it can be used to help the association
process. One way to do this is representing the evidence combing from Kalman filters and other
available constraints on the targets’ motion as belief functions, and combining them on the space
of all the possible associations between target points. For instance, if targets are known to belong
to an articulated body of known topological model (an undirected graph whose edges represent
rigid motion constraints (see Figure 6-left)), then the rigid motion constraint can be exploited to
improve the robustness of the estimation.
Formally, let us call the set of points of the known model{Mj, j = 1, · · · , N}, and{mkl , l =
1, · · · , n(k)} the measured feature points in timek image (wheren(k) is the number of detected
feature points). The data association problem the consists on finding at each timek the correct
association between points of the model and feature pointsmkl ↔ Mj. In the simplest case we can
safely assume thatn(k) = N . The information carried by predictions of Kalman filters concerns
associations between feature points belonging toconsecutive imagesmk−1l ↔ mkm, rather than




= {mk−1l ↔ mkm, ∀l,m = 1, · · · , N}
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MARKERS
RIGID LINKS














Fig. 6. (Left) Topological model of a human body: rigid motion constraints between pairs of markers are shown as links.
(Right) The family of frames involved in the data association problem: all the constraints (expressed as b.f.) are combined over
the common refinementΘ and then projected onto the current-time association frameΘkM .
The rigid motion constraint depends on the other hand on themodel-measurement association




= {mk−1l ↔ Mj, ∀j, l = 1, · · · , N}




= {mkl ↔ Mj, ∀j, l = 1, · · · , N}.
The natural place where to combine all the available evidence is then theminimal refinementof all
these frames, thecombined associationframeΘ
.
= Θk−1M ⊗Θk−1k . All the belief constraints must
be combined onΘ and projected on the current association FODΘkM by restriction, producing
the best current estimate.
Definition 9: Two belief functionsb1, b2 defined on two framesΘ and Ω connected by a
refining ρ are saidconsistentiff
mb1(A) = mb2(ρ(A)), ∀A ⊂ Θ
and b1 is called therestriction of b2 to Θ.
Now, the rigid motion constraint derived from a topological model of the body can be expressed
in a conditional way only: in fact, to test the rigidity of the motion of two measured points at
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time k we need to know the correct association between points of the model and feature points
at timek − 1. Consequently, the constraint generates an entire set of belief functions
bi : 2
ρk−1M ({ai}) → [0, 1]
where ai is the i-th possible model-featurem
k−1
l ↔ Mj association at timek − 1, and the
domains
ρk−1M ({ai})
are the elements of the partition induced on the common refinementΘ by its coarseningΘk−1M
(see Figure 6-right).
These conditional belief functionsbi must be reduced to a singletotal belief function, that will
be eventually pooled with the other constraints, stimulating the search for the generalization of
the total probability theorem to belief functions. This reads as follows.
Theorem 6:SupposeΘ and Ω are two frames of discernment, andρ : 2Ω → 2Θ a refining.
Let b0 : 2Ω → [0, 1] be a belief function defined onΩ and {b1, ..., bn} a collection ofn belief
functionsbi : 2Θi → [0, 1] defined on the elementsΘi the partition{Θ1, ..., Θn} of Θ induced
by the coarseningΩ.
Then there exists a belief function overb : 2Θ → [0, 1] such that:
1) a-priori constraint: b0 is the restriction [42] ofb to Ω;
2) conditional constraint: the conditionalbelief function obtained by combiningb with
bΘi : mbΘi (Θi) = 1,mbΘi (A) = 0∀A ⊂ Θi, A 6= Θi
coincide withbi for all i: b⊕ bΘi = bi ∀i = 1, ..., N .
The hypotheses of Theorem 6 are pictorially summarized in Figure 7. In the data association
problem the a-priori constraint is the belief function representing the estimate of the past
association{mk−1l ↔ Mj}, defined overΘk−1k (see Figure 6-right again), and ensures that
the total belief function is compatible with the last available estimate.
B. Dempster’s sum of convex combinations
The total belief theorem is only one (even though a critical one) of the theoretical issues
involved by the notion of conditional b.f. In the second part of this paper we will instead use
the language of convex geometry we introduced in the first part to give a characterization of the
August 29, 2006 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, VOL. XX, NO. Y, MONTH 2006 26
Ω
Ω






b  : 2 −> [0,1]i
i
Θ  = ρ(ω )i i
Fig. 7. The total belief theorem: a belief functionb on Θ such that its restriction toΩ is b0 and whose combination withbΘi
(where{Θ1, · · · , Θn} is the partition ofΘ induced by the refiningρ) is bi is desired.
notion of conditional b.f. in the framework of the belief space. As this notion depends inherently
on that of Dempster’s sum this reduces to study the geometry of the rule of combination.
We will first prove a fundamental result on Dempster’s sums of convex combinations, and use it
as a tool to show that the rule of combination commutes with the convex closure operator in the
belief space. This will finally allow us to describe the “global” geometry of the orthogonal sum
in terms of simplices calledconditional subspaces, i.e. the sets of all belief functions conditioned
by a given b.f.b.
Theorem 7:Consider a belief functionb and a collection of b.f.{b1, ..., bn} such that there
exists at least a belief functionbj combinable withb. If
∑





















Proof: We just need to check the equality of the corresponding basic probability assign-
ments. After denoting with{Bk} the focal elements ofbi and with {Aj} those ofb, we have
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that the convex combination
∑





































Hence, after callingE1, ..., En the focal elements of
∑

























































where the last passage holds becausembi(Ek) = 0 for Ek 6∈ Ebi, and we are left for each addenda
i with the focal elementsBk ∈ Ebi of bi.























with βi given by Equation (24). Now, if there is a b.f.bj in the collection{b1, ..., bn} which is
combinable withb, thenk(b, bj) 6= 0 and the denominator of the above equation is non-zero, i.e.
mb⊕Pi αibi is well defined.
Note that since
∑
i βi = 1, βi ≥ 0 ∀i
the combination ofb with any convex sum of belief functions is still a convex sum of all the
partial combinations.
As an example, let us consider three belief functions in the binary frameb, b1, b2 with b.p.a.s
mb(x) = 1; mb1(x) = 0.7, mb1(Θ) = 0.3; mb2(y) = 1.
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If we take the following convex combinationαb1 + (1− α)b2, α = 0.6 we have that
mαb1+(1−α)b2(x) = 0.42, mαb1+(1−α)b2(y) = 0.4, mαb1+(1−α)b2(Θ) = 0.18
and its combination withb yields
mb⊕(αb1+(1−α)b2)(x) = 1, mb⊕(αb1+(1−α)b2)(y) = 0, mb⊕(αb1+(1−α)b2)(Θ) = 0.
i.e. b⊕ (αb1 + (1− α)b2) = bx (the Bayesian b.f. focused on{x}).
On the other side, Theorem 7 claims that
b⊕ (αb1 + (1− α)b2) = β1(b⊕ b1) + β2(b⊕ b2)
with β1 =
αk(b,b1)
αk(b,b1)+(1−α)k(b,b2) , β2 =
(1−α)k(b,b2)
αk(b,b1)+(1−α)k(b,b2) , wherek(b, b1) = 1 andk(b, b2) = 0 (asb
and b2 are not combinable), so thatβ1 = 1 andβ2 = 0 and
b⊕ (αb1 + (1− α)b2) = b⊕ b1 = b1 = bx.
C. Commutativity of convex and Dempster’s combinations
In the geometric approach to the ToE convex combinations are the geometric counterparts of
basic probability assignments (Section V). Convex closure and Dempster’s sum are then the two
major operators acting on belief functions as points of the belief space.
It is not surprising to see that they are in fact inherently related to each other, as theycommute,
i.e. the order of their action on a set of b.f. can be exchanged. We just need to pay some attention
to the issue of combinability.
Theorem 8:b⊕ Cl(b1, ..., bk) = Cl(b⊕ bi1 , ..., b ⊕ bim) where{bi1 , ..., bim} ⊂ {b1, ..., bk} are
all the belief functions in the collection{b1, ..., bk} which are combinable withb.
Proof: Sufficiency.We need to prove that ifb′ ∈ b⊕Cl(b1, ..., bk) thenb′ ∈ Cl(b⊕bi1 , ..., b⊕
bim). If b
′ = b⊕∑ki=1 αibi,
∑
i αi = 1 then (by Theorem 7)b
′ =
∑
i βib⊕ bi with βi given by




βi · b⊕ bi ∈ Cl(b⊕ bi : ∃b⊕ bi).
Necessity.We have to show that ifb′ ∈ Cl(b⊕bi1 , ..., b⊕bim) thenb′ ∈ b⊕Cl(bi1 , ..., bim , bj1 , ..., bjl)
for each choice ofbj1 , ..., bjl not combinable withb.
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from Equation (24). But now∆q = 0 ∀q (as bjq is not combinable withb) so thatα′q = 0 for










p βp = 1.
Hence, any belief functionb′ of the form (27) belongs to regionb⊕Cl(bi1 , ..., bim , bj1 , ..., bjl) iff
we can find another collection of coefficients{αp, p = 1, ..., m} with
∑
p αp = 1 such that the




∀p = 1, ..., m (28)
(i.e. b′ = b⊕∑p αpbip).
An admissible solution to the system of equations (28) isα̃p
.
= βp/∆p as we get∀p βp =
βp/
∑
p βp = βp since theβp’s are normalized, and system (28) is satisfied up to the normalization












so that system (28) is still met, together with the normalization condition.
An immediate consequence is that
Corollary 3: ⊕ and Cl(.) commute, i.e. ifb is combinable withbi ∀i = 1, ..., k, then b ⊕
Cl(b1, ..., bk) = Cl(b⊕ b1, ..., b⊕ bk).
D. Conditional subspaces
As basically a linear operator onB, Dempster’s rule commute with convex closure (Corollary
3). This is fundamental in the framework of the geometric approach, where all the major classes
of b.f. form some sort of simplices. Furthermore, using the language the above commutativity
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results provide we can also identity geometric counterparts of the notions of combinability and
conditioning. The basic notion is that of conditional subspace.
Definition 10: The conditional subspace〈b〉 associated with a belief functionb is the set of
all the belief functionsconditioned byb, namely
〈b〉 .= {b⊕ b′,∀b′ ∈ B s.t. ∃ b⊕ b′}. (29)
In a sense, the conditional subspace〈b〉 is the possible “future” ofb when combined by means
of Dempster’s rule. In a process of knowledge accumulation in which new evidence becomes
available in the form of a belief function (and is combined through Dempster’s rule)
bt0 , bt0 ⊕ bt1 , bt0 ⊕ bt1 ⊕ bt2 , · · ·
the conditional subspace of the current knowledge state〈bt0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bt〉 constrains the possible
outcomes of the future states of belief.
However, since belief functions are not necessarily combinable, before we study〈b〉 we need to
understand the geometry of the notion of combinability.
Definition 11: The non-combinable regionNC(b) associated with a belief functionb is the
collection of all the b.f. which are not combinable withb,
NC(b)
.
= {b′ : 6 ∃b′ ⊕ b} = {b′ : k(b, b′) = 0}.
The results of Section V again allow us to understand the geometric shape of this set. As a matter
of fact the non-combinable regionNC(b) of b is also a simplex, whose vertices are the basis
belief functions related to subsets disjoint from the core ofb (the union of its focal elements).
Proposition 4: NC(b) = Cl(bA, A ∩ Cb = ∅).
Proof: It suffices to point out that
NC(b) = {b′ : Cb′ ⊂ Cb} = {b′ : Eb′ ⊂ 2C̄b}
whereB denotes the complement of a subsetB of Θ. But by Theorem 4
{b′ : Eb ⊂ 2C̄b} = Cl(bA, A ∈ 2C̄b) = Cl(bA : A ⊂ C̄b)} = Cl(bA : A ∩ Cb = ∅).
Using the definition of non-combinable regionNC(b) we can write
〈b〉 = b⊕ (B \NC(b)) = b⊕ {b′ : Cb′ ∩ Cb 6= ∅}
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where\ denotes the set-theoretic differenceA \B = A∩B. Unfortunately,B \NC(b) does not
satisfy Theorem 4, i.e. the collection of belief functions inB \ NC(b) cannot be written as a
set of b.f. with focal elements in a certain list, for instance{b′ : ∀A ∈ Eb′ s.t. A ∩ Cb = ∅}. In
fact a b.f.b′ is combinable withb (b′ ∈ B \NC(b)) iff oneof its focal elements has non-empty
intersection withCb, regardless the behavior of the others.
Geometrically, as we know by Theorem 4, this means thatB\NC(b) is not a simplex. Therefore
we cannot apply the commutativity results of Section VI-C directly toB \ NC(b) to find the
shape of the conditional subspace.
Fortunately,〈b〉 can indeed be expressed as a Dempster’s sum ofb and a polytope.
Definition 12: Thecompatible simplexC(b) associated with a belief functionb is the collection
of all the b.f. whose focal elements are in the core ofb:
C(b)
.
= {b′ : Cb′ ⊂ Cb} = {b′ : Eb′ ⊂ 2Cb}.
Now from Theorem 4 it follows that
Corollary 4: C(b) = Cl(bA : A ⊂ Cb).
The compatible simplexC(b) is only a proper subset of the collection of belief functions
combinable withb, B \ NC(b): nevertheless,it contains all the relevant information. As a
matter of fact,
Theorem 9:
〈b〉 = b⊕ C(b).
Proof: Let us denote withEb = {Ai} andEb′ = {Bj} the lists of focal elements ofb and
b′, respectively. By definitionAi = Ai ∩ Cb so thatBj ∩ Ai = Bj ∩ (Ai ∩ Cb) = (Bj ∩ Cb) ∩ Ai,
and once defined a new b.f.b
′′
with focal elements
{B′k, k = 1, ..., m} .= {Bj ∩ Cb, j = 1, ..., |Eb′|}









we have thatb⊕ b′ = b⊕ b′′ .
An analogous result can be found in [42].
We are now ready to understand the convex geometry of conditional subspaces. From Theorems
4 and 9 it follows that
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Corollary 5: 〈b〉 = Cl(b⊕ bA,∀A ⊂ Cb).
Note that, sinceb⊕ bCb = b (wherebCb is the basis belief function focused on the core ofb), b is
always one of the vertices of〈b〉. Furthermore,〈b〉 ⊂ C(b), since the core of a belief function
b is such that [42]Cb⊕b′ = Cb ∩ Cb′ ⊂ Cb.
1) Example: binary frame:Figure 8 shows the actual shape of a conditional subspace for
a b.f. defined on the simplest (binary) frameΘ2 = {x, y}. For each belief functionb ∈ B2,
b 6= bx, by, the non-combinable subspace is emptyNC(b) = ∅, while the compatible subspace

















Fig. 8. The conditional subspace〈b〉 of a belief functionb in the binary belief spaceB2, along with its compatible subspace.
On the abscissa we have the belief valueb(x) of x, while b(y) is the coordinate ofb on the y axis.b(Θ) = 1 = const is
neglected. Left: ifb is not a basis probability its combinable simplex isB itself, and its conditional subspace is the triangle
Cl(b, bx, by). Right: if b is a basis probability, for instance ifb = bx, then the conditional subspace reduces to a single point.
the conditional subspace〈b〉 are then
b⊕ bΘ = b, b⊕ bx = bx, b⊕ by = by
and 〈b〉 is the simplex depicted in Figure 8-left.
A singular case takes place whenb = bx or b = by (b is a basis probability assigning mass
1 to {x} or {y}). In that caseCb = {x} or {y} respectively, so thatNC(b) = {by}, {bx}
and C(b) = {bx}, {by} respectively in the two cases. Note that, for instance, whenb = bx
the compatible simplexC(b) = {bx} is much smaller than the set of b.f. combinable withb,
B2 \NC(b) = B2 \ {by}. The conditional subspace then reduces to a single point〈b〉 = {bx} or
{by} (see Figure 8-right).
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VII. A PPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE GEOMETRIC APPROACH
To conclude, we would like to give a flavor of a number of natural applications of the geometric
approach to the theory of evidence we presented in this paper, together with a hint of the possible
future developments of this framework.
A. Probabilistic approximation of a belief function
We already mentioned that one of the original motivations of this work was the probabilistic
approximation problem, i.e. the problem of finding the probability which is the “closest” in some
sense to a given belief function.
1) L1 distance in the belief space:We can first consider the possibility of using theL1 norm





Unfortunately, it turns out to be of no use since, as Theorem 10 shows, all the Bayesian functions
consistent withb have the sameL1 distance fromb.
Lemma 1: If b dominatesb′, b ≥ b′, thenCb ⊂ Cb′.
Proof: Obviously, sinceb(A) ≥ b′(A) for everyA ⊂ Θ, that is true forCb′ ⊂ Θ too, which
is also a subset ofΘ. As b′(Cb′) = 1 we have1 ≥ b(Cb′) ≥ 1 i.e. b(Cb′) = 1. By definition of
core (b(A) = 1 iff A ⊃ C) this is equivalent toCb′ ⊃ Cb.
Theorem 10:If b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is an arbitrary belief function on a frameΘ, then theL1












Proof: Lemma 1 guarantees thatCp ⊂ Cb, so thatp(A)− b(A) = 1− 1 = 0 for A ⊃ Cb. On
the other hand, ifA ∩ Cb = ∅ thenp(A)− b(A) = 0− 0 = 0. We are then left with sets which
correspond to unions of non empty proper subsets ofCb and arbitrary subsets of̄Cb = Θ \ Cb.
Notice that, by definition, ifA′ = A ∪ B, with A ⊂ Cb, B ⊂ C̄b, we haveb(A′) = b(A) (see
Theorem 9).
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sincep(A) ≥ b(A) ∀A. But then, by Equation (10)
∑
A⊂Cb,A6=Cb
p(A) = 2|Cb|−1 − p(Cb) = 2|Cb|−1 − 1
and we get Equation (30).
2) L2 distance and orthogonal projection:Since theL1 norm is not suitable to be used
as a distance between belief functions, we can think of using the standard Euclidean distance
‖b − b′‖L2 =
√∑
A⊂Θ |b(A)− b′(A)|2. Remember that the Bayesian simplexP determines a
linear subspace ofRN−2. It makes then sense to define theorthogonal projectionof a belief
function b onto P. By definition, the orthogonal projectionπ[b] of b onto P is the unique
Bayesian function which minimizes theL2 distance betweenb andP in the belief space:
π[b] = arg min
p∈P





In [12] we studied the problem of finding the expression ofπ[b] in terms of the belief values of
the original belief functionb, and proved a number of properties it possesses. In particular, we







i αi = 1
mirroring a similar property of the pignistic function.
3) Approximation criterion based on Dempster’s rule:Of course many different optimization
criteria can be proposed, yielding distinct approximation problems. However, the rule of combi-
nation is central in the theory of evidence: a belief function is useful only when it is combined
with others in a reasoning process. It is natural to think that this should be taken into account
when tacking the approximation problem.
A possible way to comply is to formulate an optimization problem based on the “external”
behavior of the desired approximation.
Criterion. A good approximation of a belief function, when combined with any other b.f.,
must produce results similar to those obtained by combining the original belief function.
Analytically, this yields the following optimization problem




dist(b⊕ b′, b′′ ⊕ b′)db′ (31)
where b is the original belief function to approximate,b′ ∈ B is an arbitrary belief function
on the same frame,dist is some distance function, andA is the class of belief functions the
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approximation belongs to. Of course the role of⊕ can be played by any other meaningful
operator, like for instance the disjunctive rule of combination for unnormalized belief functions
[45]. Possibly, the resulting approximation should be independent from the choice of this distance
used in (31).
Let us consider here the classA = P of the Bayesian belief functions. Sincẽplb represents
perfectly b when combined with any Bayesian function [49]
b⊕ p = p̃lb ⊕ p ∀p ∈ P
the modified version of the approximation problem (31) in which the original b.f. is combined
with Bayesian belief functions only is trivially solved bỹplb:




‖b⊕ p′ − p⊕ p′‖dp′ (32)
whatever the norm we choose, asb⊕ p′− p⊕ p′ = 0 ∀p′. It is then natural to conjecture that the
relative plausibility function could be the solution of the general approximation problem (31),
too. We will work on this conjecture in the near future.
B. The geometry of possibility measures
A consonant belief function is a b.f. whose focal elements are nested. All the possible lists
of focal elements associated with consonant belief functions then correspond to all the possible
chains of subsets
A1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Am
of Θ. Theorem 4 then implies that all the b.f.s whose focal elements belong to a chainX =
{A1, ..., Am} is Cl(bA1 , ..., bAm). The region of the belief space formed by consonant belief





Cl(bA1 , ..., bAn).







= n!. Since the length of a maximal chain is the cardinalityn of Θ, the dimension of
these convex components isdim Cl(bA1 , ..., bAn) = n− 1.
In [14] we showed thatCO has the form of asimplicial complex, i.e. a collection of simplices
such that: 1. if a simplex belongs to the collection, then all its faces of any dimension also
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belong to it; 2. the intersection of twod-dimensional simplices is a face of both the intersecting
simplices.
The geometric description of consonant belief functions in the belief space pictures then a sort
of duality between probability and possibility measures, represented by the dichotomy simplex
- simplicial complex. It is not hard to show that this is due to the connection of those measures




P (x), Pos(A) = max
x∈A
Pos(x).
Recalling Section VII-A, the duality principle would then imply to choose as possibilistic
approximation (see also [23], [4]) of a belief functionb, according to the optimization criterion





In the near future we are going to work on a formal proof of this conjecture.
C. Canonical decomposition
A large class of belief functions is composed by all the b.f. which are the result of a Dempster’s
sum of simple support b.f.
Definition 13: A separable support functionis a belief function which is either a simple
support b.f., or is equal to the orthogonal sum of two or more simple support functions, namely
b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn
wheren ≥ 1, andbi is a simple support b.f.∀i = 1, .., n.
Separable support functions can be decomposed in different ways. However [42],
Proposition 5: If b 6= bΘ is a non-vacuous separable support function with coreCb then
there exists auniquecollectionb1, ..., bn of non-vacuous simple support functions satisfying the
following conditions: 1)n ≥ 1; 2) b = b1 if n = 1, andb = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn if n ≥ 1; 3) Cbi ⊂ Cb;
4) Cbi 6= Cbj if i 6= j.
This unique decomposition is calledcanonical decomposition. Smets [46] and Kramosil [29]
solved the canonical decomposition problem by means of algebraic and measure-theoretic meth-
ods, respectively. Schubert [39] has also studied the issue. We can nevertheless think of using
our knowledge of the shape of conditional subspaces (Theorem 9) to find the simple components
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Fig. 9. Canonical decomposition of a separable support b.f. in the binary belief space.
of a separable belief functionb.
It is indeed quite easy to note that, in the binary case (b ∈ B2), the simple componentsex, ey of
a separable support b.f. can be expressed as
ex = Cl(b, b⊕ by) ∩ Cl(bΘ, bx) = Cl(b, by) ∩ Cl(bΘ, bx),
ey = Cl(b, bx) ∩ Cl(bΘ, by).












A general geometric proof of the solution looks then well within reach.
VIII. C ONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we introduced a geometric approach to the theory of evidence, in which belief
functions are thought of as points of a Cartesian space whose coordinates are their belief values.
Starting from the insight provided by the binary case we first proved the convexity of the belief
space, and then showed thatB has in fact the form of apolytopeor simplex, in which the
basic probability assignment of a b.f.b plays the role of the simplicial coordinate ofb in B. We
then focused our attention on the second pillar of the ToE, Dempster’s rule of combination. We
proved an important result on Dempster’s sums of convex combinations, and used it as a tool
to show that the rule of combination commutes with the convex closure operator in the belief
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space. This finally allowed us to describe the “global” geometry of the orthogonal sum in terms
of simplices calledconditional subspaces, i.e. sets of belief functions conditioned by a given b.f.
b. We concluded by discussing some open topics in the geometric approach, paying particular
attention to the probabilistic approximation problem, as distances between belief functions in
the belief space can be easily discussed, and approximations criteria based on Dempster’s rule
can be solved by exploiting the commutativity results we exposed in this paper.
A straightforward application of our characterization of the global geometry of Dempster’s rule
is the canonical decomposition of a belief function into simple support (pseudo) b.f., while a
natural direction of research is the study of thepoint-wisebehavior of⊕. On the other side, a
description of the geometry of possibility measures or consonant belief functions can be seen
as a first step towards a unified geometric interpretations of uncertainty measures.
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